UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24906
5 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 16 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Antigua and Barbuda to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to the latter's note dated 26 October 1992, requesting information on the implementation of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 778 (1992).

The Permanent Representative of Antigua and Barbuda to the United Nations has the honour to state that there are no funds of the Government of Iraq in any banking institution in Antigua and Barguda; and no petroleum or petroleum products have ever been purchased by the Government of Antigua and Barbuda from the Government of Iraq, or its State bodies, corporations or agencies. Consequently, the Government of Antigua and Barbuda is complying fully with the provisions of paragraph 4 of resolution 778 (1992).

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/24907
5 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERABLE DATED 19 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GERMANY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to the latter's note of 26 October 1992, has the honour to confirm, after consulting the German banks, that they hold no deposits of the Government of Iraq or of its State bodies, corporations or agencies that represent the proceeds of the sale of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products paid for by or on behalf of purchasers since 6 August 1990, as specified in Security Council resolution 778 (1992).

This is to confirm also that there are no petroleum or petroleum products owned by the Government of Iraq or by its State bodies, corporations or agencies currently stored under the jurisdiction of the German Government, as specified in paragraph 2 of resolution 778 (1992).

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GENERAL

S/24908
5 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 20 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THAILAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to his note dated 26 October 1992 concerning paragraph 4 of resolution 778 (1992), has the honour to inform the latter that his Government has determined that, under its jurisdiction, there are no petroleum or petroleum products or funds of the Government of Iraq, or of its State bodies, corporations, or agencies, that represent the proceeds of sale of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products subject to the provisions of resolution 778 (1992).

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UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/24909
5 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 20 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to the latter's note dated 26 October 1992, has the honour to state that India has no funds of the Government of Iraq, or its State bodies, corporations or agencies that represent the proceeds of sale of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products, paid for by or on behalf of the purchaser on or after 6 August 1990.

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UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/24910
5 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 30 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MONGOLIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Mongolia to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, in reference to the latter's note dated 26 October 1992, concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 778 (1992), has the honour to inform him that on the territory under the jurisdiction of the Government of Mongolia there are no funds of the Government of Iraq, or of its State bodies, corporations or agencies that represent the proceeds of sale of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products, paid for or on behalf of the purchaser on or after 6 August 1990.

The Permanent Representative of Mongolia further wishes to inform the Secretary-General that the Government of Mongolia has no information on whereabouts and amounts of any petroleum or petroleum products owned by the Government of Iraq, or by its State bodies, corporations or agencies.

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UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/24911
5 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 3 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ITALY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT

The Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the Organization and, with reference to the Secretary-General's note of 26 October 1992, has the honour to state that the Italian Government is in the process of implementing Security Council resolution 778 (1992) through a decree, which in essence should place particular emphasis on:

(a) Transfer to the United Nations escrow account of all Iraqi funds deposited in Italy, as well as the ones originating from oil exportations, the payment of which was suspended as a result of the embargo;

(b) Mandatory sale of petroleum or petroleum products owned by the Government of Iraq in Italy and subsequent transfer of the proceeds to the United Nations escrow account;

(c) Acquisition by the Government of data pertaining to the execution of the provisions of resolution 778 (1992) from financial institutions and business companies;

(d) A voluntary contribution by the Italian Government, projected in the amount of 5 billion Italian lire, preferably to be used to provide humanitarian relief to the Iraqi population.

The Permanent Mission of Italy will inform the Secretariat on the issuance of the decree, which should take place before the end of the current year.

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UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/24912
4 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 4 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 661 (1990) CONCERNING THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith for the attention of the members of the Council the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the Guidelines to Facilitate Full International Implementation of Paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991).

The report was approved by the Committee on 4 December 1992.

(Signed) Peter HOHENFELLNER
Chairman

Annex

Report of the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the Guidelines to Facilitate Full International Implementation of Paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)

1. The present report is submitted by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait in accordance with paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the Guidelines 1/ to Facilitate Full International Implementation of Paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, which were approved by Security Council resolution 700 (1991) of 17 June 1991.

2. Under paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the Guidelines, the Committee is required to report at 90-day intervals to the Security Council on the implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq contained in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. The present report is the sixth report submitted under the above-mentioned guidelines. The preceding reports were submitted on 13 September 1991, 2/ 10 December 1991, 3/ 12 March 1992, 4/ 11 June 1992 5/ and 8 September 1992. 6/

3. By paragraph 12 of the Guidelines, all States are requested to report to the Committee any information that may have come to their attention relating to possible violations of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq committed by other States or foreign nationals. During the period under review no information as requested by paragraph 12 of the Guidelines has been received by the Committee.

4. In accordance with paragraphs 13 and 15 of the Guidelines, all States and international organizations ought to consult the Committee on the question of whether certain items fall within the provisions of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), as well as in cases relating to dual-use or multiple-use items, i.e., items meant for civilian use but with potential for diversion or conversion to military use. During the period under review, no States or international organizations have consulted the Committee on these questions.

5. By paragraph 14 of the Guidelines, international organizations are requested to provide the Committee with any relevant information that may come to their attention. During the period under review, no information as requested by paragraph 14 of the Guidelines has been received by the Committee.

6. In a note dated 24 November 1992, 7/ the President of the Security Council published the text of the statement made to the media on behalf of the members of the Council. He had stated that the members of the Council had held informal consultations on 24 November 1992 pursuant to paragraphs 21 and 28 of resolution 687 (1991) and paragraph 6 of resolution 700 (1991). After hearing all the opinions expressed in the course of the consultations, the

President of the Council had concluded that there was no agreement that the necessary conditions existed for a modification of the regimes established in paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991), as referred to in paragraph 21 of that resolution; in paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 of resolution 687 (1991), as referred to in paragraph 28 of that resolution; and in paragraph 6 of resolution 700 (1991).

7. Since the submission of the previous report of the Committee on 8 September 1992, 6/ no allegations of violations, particularly in connection with paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), have been reported to the Committee.

8. The Committee will continue its efforts to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it. Since the last report of the Secretary-General, dated 4 December 1991, 8/ no further replies have been received from Member States pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 700 (1991).

Notes

1/ See S/22660, annex.

2/ S/23036.

3/ S/23279.

4/ S/23708.

5/ S/24083.

6/ S/24545.

7/ S/24843.

8/ S/22884/Add.2.

UNITED
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General Assembly Security Council

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GENERAL

A/47/758
S/24913
7 December 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Agenda item 69
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING
OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Letter dated 4 December 1992 from the Permanent Representatives of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

We have the honour to circulate herewith the text of a tripartite declaration issued by our three Governments on 27 November 1992, the anniversary of the tripartite declaration on terrorism following the investigation into the bombings of flights Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 (A/46/828-S/23309).

We should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 69, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jean-Bernard MERIMEE
Permanent Representative of
France to the United Nations

(Signed) D. H. A. HANNAY
Permanent Representative of
the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland
to the United Nations

(Signed) Edward J. PERKINS
Permanent Representative of
the United States of America
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Declaration of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on Libyan terrorism

(27 November 1992)

One year ago today, the United States, France and the United Kingdom declared that, "following the investigations into the bombing of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772, the three States have presented specific demands to Libyan authorities related to the judicial procedures that are under way. They require that Libya comply with all these demands, and in addition, that Libya commit itself concretely and definitively to cease all forms of terrorist action and all assistance to terrorist groups. Libya must promptly, by concrete actions, prove its renunciation of terrorism".

On 21 January 1992, the United Nations Security Council, in resolution 731, deplored Libya's failure to respond positively and called upon it to do so immediately. On 31 March 1992, the United Nations Security Council, in resolution 748, expressed its deep concern that Libya still had not fully complied with resolution 731 and imposed mandatory sanctions upon Libya to persuade it to comply. These sanctions entered into force on 15 April 1992.

Today, the United States, France and the United Kingdom condemn Libya's failure to comply with the requirements of the United Nations Security Council. The Libyan Government continues its attempt to escape its international obligations through equivocation and delay. By its evasion, Libya continues to flout international law.

On this anniversary, the three States strongly reaffirm their single objective with respect to Libya: prompt, complete and unequivocal compliance with the terms of United Nations Security Council resolutions 731 and 748. Justice for all 441 victims of the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings, and international peace and security, which is threatened by Libya's support of terrorism, require no less.

Accordingly, the United States, France and the United Kingdom are determined to intensify their efforts, in close cooperation with the United Nations Secretary-General, to make the sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council in March yet more effective. They call upon the Government of Libya to end its defiance of the international community. Libya's continued failure to fulfil its international obligations will only result in furthering its isolation from the world community. The United States, France and the United Kingdom, together with all members of the international community, will continue closely to monitor Libya's actions. The Government of Libya is greatly mistaken if it doubts their resolve.

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GENERAL

A/47/759
S/24914
7 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Agenda item 45
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Letter dated 7 December 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Further to my letter of 27 November 1992 (A/47/736-S/24862) concerning the acceptance by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus of the confidence-building measures proposed in your report (S/24830 of 19 November 1992) and in Security Council resolution 789 (1992), adopted unanimously on 25 November 1992, I have the honour to forward herewith a letter dated 30 November 1992 addressed to you by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. George Vassiliou, in which, inter alia, specific proposals are made in connection with the withdrawal of the Turkish forces from Cyprus and the demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 45, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) A. J. JACOVIDES
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
the Republic of Cyprus
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Letter dated 30 November 1992 from the President of the Republic of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

I should like to express to you and, through you, to all the members of the Security Council, my thanks and appreciation for the adoption of Security Council resolution 789 (1992). The Government of the Republic of Cyprus endorses fully the resolution and is ready to contribute in every possible way to the success of the forthcoming negotiating process.

It is therefore of the utmost importance that we proceed to the implementation of the resolution, in order to render it an effective tool for achieving the necessary progress, in accordance with the spirit that animated the members of the Security Council.

I have already informed you, through my letter of 24 November 1992, that the Government of Cyprus accepts the measures you have proposed and which the Security Council subsequently endorsed in its resolution, and is ready and willing to proceed with their implementation.

Unfortunately the statements of the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Cetin, that Turkey does not accept resolution 789 (1992) and that every country can, at its discretion, accept some resolutions and reject others according to its interests, are not encouraging at all and even raise fundamental issues of principle concerning the Security Council itself. We hope that the Security Council will not accept such an interpretation of its role and such selectivity in the implementation of its resolutions.

The Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Suleyman Demirel, has declared that Turkey is ready to proceed with the withdrawal of all its forces in Cyprus, provided the security of the Turkish Cypriot Community is safeguarded. I should like to bring to your attention that, since 1988, I have been advocating the complete demilitarization of Cyprus. I have proposed the dismantling of the military forces of the Republic of Cyprus if all Turkish troops and settlers withdraw from the island and the armed elements that have fostered are disbanded. I should therefore once more reiterate our willingness to proceed with the demilitarization of Cyprus, firmly believing that the implementation of this proposal would be the greatest single contribution towards the security of all Cypriots.

If, however, Mr. Demirel believes that the complete demilitarization of Cyprus is not in itself sufficient guarantee for the security of the Turkish Cypriot Community, which I believe it is, we are ready to accept a United Nations force, the size and role of which can be defined by the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations, in order to supervise the whole process and guarantee the security of all Cypriots.

I am convinced, Mr. Secretary-General, that such a development will contribute substantially to our efforts to reach a solution. On our behalf, I would like to assure you that we are ready and willing to contribute in every possible way to its realization.

(Signed) George VASSILIOU

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/24915
7 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARMENIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a facsimile letter from Mr. Levon Ter-Petrossian, President of the Republic of Armenia, dated 7 December 1992, declaring a state of national disaster in Armenia and appealing for humanitarian assistance.

I would be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Alexander ARZOUMANIAN
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Letter dated 7 December 1992 from the President of Armenia addressed to the President of the Security Council

EMERGENCY APPEAL

I, the President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, on behalf of the people of Armenia, declare the Republic of Armenia in a state of national disaster.

Due to the devastating effects the Azeri blockade has had on the country, creating a severe energy crisis, the Government appeals to all nations of the world, all international humanitarian organizations and government agencies to provide assistance to the people of Armenia for the next 12 months in order to secure the survival of the people through the harsh winter months.

According to the assessment survey of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees of 14 October 1992, the economic collapse of Armenia is attributed to the "blockade of Armenia [which] has been de facto in force from Azerbaijan/Nakhichevan, Turkey (according to the intergovernmental agreement, Turkey is supplying only grain via its railroad) and, lately, Georgia. Should attempts aimed at opening one or two relief corridors through Turkey, and, if possible, Georgia, fail, we are convinced that a catastrophe will take place this winter". Other assessments by United Nations teams, the United States of America, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the American Red Cross, and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies corroborate these findings.

The Government and people of Armenia urgently require sustained, effective humanitarian assistance in order to prevent deaths in the tens of thousands from exposure, hunger and inadequate medical attention.

Unless immediate action is taken to transport fuel, grain, food items and winterization items as well as medical supplies into the Republic, the dismal projections made by various assessment teams will become a reality. Thus, on behalf of the people of Armenia, I, the President of the country, urge all Governments and humanitarian agencies to respond immediately by putting pressure on different nations to allow the transportation of fuel and aid into the country.

(Signed) Levon TER-PETROSSIAN

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/24916
7 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Acting under paragraph 1 of Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, in view of the dramatic increase in aggression against Sarajevo and Bihac and cities in central Bosnia, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina requests an emergency meeting of the Security Council, to stop the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Sarajevo has endured days of intensified shelling where the airport has since been closed, and a western suburb of Otes has fallen. Otes fell primarily because the defender forces ran out of armour-piercing ammunition needed to neutralize the 20 tanks used by the aggressor. The defender forces had no tanks. The defenders were also at a tremendous disadvantage as the aggressor forces were able to fire 64 artillery shells for every one fired by the defenders. More than 4,000 shells have fallen on Otes since the Serb and Montenegrin extremists began their attack on Tuesday. According to Brig.-General Hussein Ali Abdul-Razek, commander of the United Nations Protection Force in Sarajevo: "All our efforts here to save lives and restore utilities have completely failed."

The aggresssor forces have also significantly intensified their attacks on cities in the northern corridor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where numerous violations of Security Council resolution 781 (1992) have been recorded, despite numerous local and general cease-fires. The corridor would link occupied territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to Serbia, as previously noted by Lord Owen in his statement to the Security Council on 13 November 1992.

Excellency, the dramatic increase in aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina continues anew despite numerous positive resolutions by the Security Council. The Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina demands that the Security Council take immediate measures, including the use of force under Chapter VII, to enforce its resolutions and stop this aggression.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/24917
1 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(for the period 1 June 1992 to 30 November 1992)

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INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 1 June 1992 to 30 November 1992 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Secretary-General's mission of good offices pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions concerning Cyprus. In its resolution 759 (1992) of 12 June 1992 the Security Council called upon all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with UNFICYP on the basis of the present mandate. It also requested the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices and to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made. 1/

I. MANDATE AND COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

2. The functions of UNFICYP were originally defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) in the following terms:

> "In the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."

That mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in 1964, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, most recently in its resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992. In connection with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council has adopted a number of resolutions, some of which required the Force to perform certain additional or modified functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire. 2/

3. The table below shows the establishment of UNFICYP as at 30 November 1992:

	Military personnel		
Austria	HQ UNFICYP	7	
	Infantry battalion, UNAB	331	
	Military police company	9	347
Canada	HQ UNFICYP	7	
	HQ CANCON	5	
	The First Regiment The Royal Canadian Horse Artillery	538	
	Signal squadron	14	
	Military police company	11	575

Denmark	HQ UNFICYP	5	
	Infantry battalion, DANCON 57	323	
	Military police company	13	341
Finland	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military police company	3	7
Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	6	
	Military police company	2	8
Sweden	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military police company	3	7
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	19	
	HQ BRITCON	6	
	Force scout car squadron, A Squadron, 16th/5th Lancers	109	
	5th Regiment Royal Artillery	339	
	UNFICYP support regiment	45	
	Royal engineer detachment	8	
	Signal squadron	53	
	Army aviation flight	18	
	Transport squadron	103	
	Medical centre	5	
	Ordnance detachment	11	
	Workshops	30	
	Military police company	9	755
	Civilian police		
Australia		20	
Sweden		18	38
Totoal UNFICYP			2 078

4. In my report in document S/24581 of 21 September 1992, I stated that contributing Governments had given firm indications that they would be reducing the operational commitment of their contingents. These reductions will include the withdrawal of the Danish infantry battalion (though some of its personnel will remain in UNFICYP headquarters), the reduction of the British contingent by 198 personnel, including the whole of the Force scout car squadron, and reductions in the Austrian and Canadian contingents of 63 and 61 personnel, respectively. This will reduce UNFICYP's strength from 2,078 to 1,488 personnel, a reduction of approximately 28 per cent. In order to maintain the Force's ability to implement its present mandate to the greatest extent possible, restructuring and reorganization of the remaining contingents commenced on 16 November 1992 when the 63 Austrian personnel were withdrawn and will be completed by 15 December 1992.

5. The sectors will be reduced from four to three (as shown on the attached map). The British battalion will assume responsibility for the whole of the sector previously controlled by the Danish contingent. This will be known as Sector Two and will cover the area from Kokkina to the United Nations protected area (UNPA). Sector Three, controlled by the Canadian battalion, will expand to the west and will now cover the area from the UNPA to Athienou. There will be no change to the area monitored by the Austrian contingent, Sector Four. The Force reserve will consist of four reinforcement platoons, one from each sector plus one from the support regiment.

6. As a result of the troop-contributing Governments' decisions to reduce their contingents, the number of permanently manned observation posts will have to fall from 51 to 39. This will mean that in future UNFICYP may not be able to react as rapidly as in the past to cease-fire violations or incidents. The Force's ability to maintain constant liaison and communication with all command levels of the military forces of both sides will also be affected. It is, therefore, extremely important that both sides exercise the greatest possible restraint and make every effort to avoid incidents that could lead to tension in the buffer zone.

7. Mr. Oscar Camilión continued as my Special Representative in Cyprus. The Force remained under the command of Major-General Michael F. Minehane.

II. RELATIONS WITH THE PARTIES

8. UNFICYP maintained close liaison and cooperation at all levels with the two sides in order to carry out its tasks effectively. The Force had freedom of movement in the southern part of the island, except for restricted military installations. Regarding movement in the north of the island, the guidelines established in 1983 3/ and subsequently improved in practice, continued to be applied, although UNFICYP experienced frequent difficulties. Efforts to increase UNFICYP's freedom of movement in the northern part of the island remained unsuccessful despite direct discussions with all concerned and assurances given to UNFICYP that a positive response would be forthcoming in the near future.

9. During the period under review, there was an increase in the number of occasions on which UNFICYP vehicles and personnel were stopped by the military forces of both sides when approaching or entering the United Nations buffer zone. In addition, UNFICYP patrols continued to encounter interference when operating in areas of the buffer zone that are sensitive or are not frequently patrolled. During the last six months, there was a marked increase in the number of incidents on both sides when weapons were cocked and pointed at UNFICYP personnel on foot and in vehicles. On one occasion, a Turkish forces sentry fired a warning shot at an UNFICYP soldier in the buffer zone. UNFICYP made strong representations to the authorities of both sides, emphasizing the dangers of such actions while reiterating UNFICYP'S right to complete access to, and freedom of movement in, all parts of the buffer zone.

10. Following UNFICYP representations to Turkish Cypriot authorities, there was an improvement in the conduct of Turkish Cypriot police officers towards UNFICYP humanitarian staff and minorities resident in the north. UNFICYP must continue to rely on the firm support and cooperation of all parties in permitting uninterrupted freedom of movement and action so that it can carry out its established and important duties and responsibilities.

III. FUNCTIONS OF THE FORCE

A. Maintenance of the cease-fire and the status quo

11. The cease-fire lines extend approximately 180 kilometres from the Kokkina enclave and Kato Pyrgos on the north-west coast to the east coast south of Famagusta in the area of Dherinia. The area between the lines is known as the United Nations buffer zone. Its width varies from 20 metres to 7 kilometres, and it covers about 3 per cent of the island, including some of the most valuable agricultural land.

12. UNFICYP keeps the United Nations buffer zone under constant surveillance through a system of 151 observation posts, of which 51 (shortly to be reduced to 39) are permanently manned. Mobile and standing patrols are also employed, especially in sensitive areas. High-powered binoculars and night-vision devices are used to monitor the cease-fire lines on a continuous basis.

13. The UNFICYP patrol track runs the length of the United Nations buffer zone, and is essential to the ability of the Force to monitor the cease-fire lines, supervise civilian activities in the buffer zone, resupply observation posts and react promptly to incidents. British Royal Engineers maintain this track in usable condition.

14. In May 1992, 4/ I reported that UNFICYP had agreed to permit the National Guard to clear mines from an area of the buffer zone, on the understanding that the land would be designated for farming, and that despite strong protests from UNFICYP the National Guard had subsequently relaid the minefield. I also reported that the Government of Cyprus had agreed to remove the mines in question. During the period under review, the Government's commitment in this regard was not fulfilled, despite further representations by UNFICYP.

15. The number of cease-fire violations increased slightly in the last six months, but both sides continued to demonstrate restraint and discipline in this respect. There continued to be isolated incidents when shots were thought to have been fired deliberately. The military forces on both sides cooperated with UNFICYP's investigations and tension remained at a low level.

16. The 1989 agreement concerning the unmanning of certain positions in Nicosia continued to hold, with only a few minor violations by both sides. I have requested the Force Commander to initiate discussions to extend the agreement to all areas of the buffer zone where the troops of both sides

remain in close proximity to each other. In response to my report of 19 November 1992, 1/ the Security Council, in its resolution 789 (1992), urged both sides to commit themselves to these measures.

17. During the period under review, there was a slight increase in the number of air violations, with 40 overflights of the buffer zone by Turkish forces aircraft and 13 by National Guard aircraft. In addition, there were 17 overflights from the north and 8 from the south by civilian aircraft and 20 overflights by the Cyprus police airwing. Civilian or military aircraft of other countries accounted for a further 7 overflights. These violations create tension and increase the risk of serious incidents.

18. Once again during the period under review, the National Guard increased its programme of construction all along its cease-fire line. This remained a contentious issue, which at times caused an increase in tension and retaliation in kind by the Turkish forces. On two occasions UNFICYP strongly protested work on positions that were clearly in the buffer zone and therefore constituted a major cease-fire violation. The National Guard often refused to cooperate in UNFICYP's investigations and were reluctant to allow inspections of their positions.

19. There were no incidents in the fenced area of Varosha. UNFICYP continued to monitor the area closely to ensure that the status quo was maintained. However, UNFICYP's freedom of movement within the area continued to be restricted by the Turkish Cypriot security forces. As has been previously reported to the Security Council, the United Nations considers the Government of Turkey responsible for maintaining the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha. 5/ This position has been reiterated to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities on numerous occasions.

20. Despite UNFICYP's continued representations, Greek Cypriot tourist and fishing boats continued to violate the seaward extensions of the cease-fire lines known as the maritime security lines, which were established by UNFICYP as a practical measure for security and safety purposes 6/ in the vicinity of Kokkina and Famagusta. These violations raise tension and are potentially dangerous for the individuals concerned. I would, therefore, urge restraint by all parties and request them to assist UNFICYP in supporting this practical and necessary measure.

21. As stressed in my last report, 4/ threats to safety and security arose as a result of hunting by Greek Cypriots in certain areas of the buffer zone during the 1990/91 hunting season. This prompted UNFICYP to seek a ban on hunting in the buffer zone in the future. Following UNFICYP representations, the Government extended its support for this policy. As a consequence, the number of violations significantly decreased. However, UNFICYP has been obliged to commit considerable military and police personnel to maintain the integrity of the buffer zone during the hunting season. I trust that the government enforcement agencies will continue their efforts to eliminate hunting by Greek Cypriots in the buffer zone.

22. Each side again conveyed to me its concern about the strength of the military forces on the other side. For my own part, I remain very concerned about the size and development of the military forces on both sides. This situation creates tension and increases the risk of serious incidents. As I stated in my report of 19 November 1992, 1/ and as was endorsed by the Council in its resolution 789 (1992), a reduction of the non-Cypriot troops to the level of a decade ago and the reciprocal suspension of the weapons acquisition programme on the Greek Cypriot side would contribute greatly to alleviating the deep crisis of confidence between the two sides.

B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions

23. As part of its efforts to promote a return to normal conditions, UNFICYP has for many years worked with technical authorities and agencies of both parties to facilitate humanitarian activities. It has used its "good offices" to sponsor bicommunal contacts and has encouraged authorities to cooperate in restoring normal conditions for members of both communities. Some successes have been achieved. However, these activities are labour intensive and the imminent reduction in UNFICYP's strength will constrain its ability to play as large a role as in the past. I accordingly urge both parties to increase their own efforts to cooperate in the management of essential humanitarian services and, in line with my report of 19 November and resolution 789 (1992), to promote people-to-people contact by reducing travel restrictions across the buffer zone.

24. Water reserves on the island remain satisfactory. A normal winter rainfall should replenish stocks and extend supplies well into 1993. Water authorities continue to honour bicommunal understandings on water distribution and cooperate on the repair of infrastructure. However, the condition of the Morphou aquifer continues to deteriorate. Despite pleas for cooperation to examine the extent of damage in order to formulate a bicommunal solution, no success has been achieved to date.

25. The number of Greek Cypriots in the northern part of the island is now 544, of whom 541 live in the Karpas peninsula and the remaining 3 in Kyrenia. UNFICYP continued to provide them with humanitarian support, delivering foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Government of Cyprus and the Cyprus Red Cross. Turkish Cypriot authorities continued to levy customs duty on supplies deemed to be non-humanitarian in nature.

26. Again this year textbooks were not delivered to Greek Cypriot elementary schools in the Karpas in time for the 1992 academic year. UNFICYP obtained the texts early in May 1992, but the Turkish Cypriot authorities took an inordinate time to review them and then refused 35 out of 89 on the grounds that they contained material which was considered offensive to Turkish Cypriots.

27. UNFICYP continued to interview Greek Cypriots who applied for "permanent transfer" to the southern part of the island in order to verify that the

transfer was voluntary. Two such transfers took place during the reporting period. UNFICYP also facilitated 601 visits by Greek Cypriots from the Karpas area to the southern part of the island. UNFICYP continued to request that Turkish Cypriot authorities loosen the current tight restrictions on the frequency and duration of temporary transfers to the south by Greek Cypriots living in the north.

28. UNFICYP continued its periodic visits to Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island and assisted in arranging family reunion visits for Turkish Cypriots at the Ledra Palace hotel. For some time, it has been apparent that Turkish Cypriot authorities give preference to applications for family meetings which originate in the north. Despite assurances from Turkish Cypriot officials, the majority of applications from Turkish Cypriots living in the south are not facilitated.

29. The number of Maronites living in the northern part of the island has continued to decline and is now 250. UNFICYP continued to help them contact Maronites living elsewhere on the island and delivered to them foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Cyprus Government.

30. UNFICYP continued to provide emergency medical services, including medical evacuation of civilian members of both communities resident in the north. When the need arose, UNFICYP delivered medicines through the Red Cross to members of the Turkish Cypriot community. Difficulties associated with the transport of Turkish Cypriots to hospital in the south were satisfactorily resolved.

31. Since 1974, UNFICYP has provided many essential services in support of the Cyprus Red Cross. In an effort to reduce demands on UNFICYP's declining manpower, UNFICYP recommended that Red Cross officials of both parties discuss how they can progressively resume their original responsibilities. The Greek Cypriot officials gave initial support for such discussions, but the Turkish Cypriot side failed to respond positively.

32. The mixed village of Pyla, located in the buffer zone, remained a major preoccupation for UNFICYP. The Force has actively assisted the two mukhtars in exercising the full range of their responsibilities and has, on a strictly humanitarian basis, facilitated practical solutions to various controversial issues.

33. Recently, Turkish Cypriot authorities raised tension in Pyla by initiating projects without the required notification to, and permission of, UNFICYP. A project to upgrade the electricity service to Turkish Cypriots was terminated by UNFICYP on these grounds. A second project to erect a bust of Kemal Ataturk at the Turkish Cypriot elementary school was initially stopped, but after a full investigation and presentation of the required application UNFICYP allowed the project to be completed. The Turkish military post located in the buffer zone overlooking Pyla was responsible for several provocative actions, which caused tension in the village.

34. The Cyprus police control point on the Larnaca-Pyla road, south of the buffer zone, continued to block the flow of tourists and other visitors to Pyla and has severely disrupted its economy. On a number of occasions, UNFICYP has requested that this obstacle be removed.

35. UNFICYP continued to pursue discussion with the parties in order to facilitate telephone communications between Turkish Cypriot residents of Pyla and the north. It was pleased to learn that Turkish Cypriot officials are preparing to provide telephone services for Greek Cypriots in the Karpas and Maronites living in the Kormokiti area. UNFICYP continued to promote these important humanitarian projects.

36. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continues to promote bicommunal activities aimed at bringing together Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot expertise in areas of mutual concern. Some bicommunal activities were held outside the buffer zone and alternatively in the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Efforts were made to move the bicommunal programmes from training and seminars to direct service activities. A medical centre intended to serve both Greek and Turkish Cypriots is being constructed. Neurology and genetics, cardiology and kidney and liver transplant are its pioneering components.

37. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as coordinator of the United Nations system's operational activities for development, continued its activities in the framework of the Nicosia Master Plan and pursued bicommunal projects with the various United Nations technical agencies active in Cyprus including the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

IV. COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS

38. During the period under review, the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus held five sessions (sixty-second to sixty-sixth), consisting of 18 meetings, of which 12 were attended by the 3 members of the Committee and their assistants and 6 were attended solely by the 3 members.

39. In my last report, 4/ I referred to a number of recommendations which had been made to both sides and which, if implemented, would permit the Committee to function in a more rational and effective way than it has in the past. This would, of course, be fully in accordance with its humanitarian objectives.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

40. The cost to the United Nations of maintaining UNFICYP for a further period of six months beyond 15 December 1992, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Force and based on the revised strength

and responsibilities as outlined in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the present report, is estimated at $9.5 million, as detailed below:

UNFICYP cost estimate by major category of expense

(In thousands of United States dollars)

I.	Operational costs incurred by the United Nations	
	Movement of contingents	200
	Operational expenses	1 600
	Premises (maintenance, utilities, etc.)	590
	Rations	700
	Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc.	3 330
	Death and disability	100
	Miscellaneous and contingencies	250
	Total I	6 770
II.	Reimbursement of extra costs of Governments providing contingents	
	Pay, allowances and transport	1 950
	Contingent-owned equipment	780
	Total II	2 730
	Grand total (I and II)	9 500

41. The above estimate does not reflect the full cost of the operation. It excludes, in particular, the regular costs that would be incurred by troop contributors if their contingents were serving at home (i.e., regular pay and allowances and normal expenses for matériel), as well as such extra costs as they have agreed to absorb.

42. That part of the financing of the cost of the Force which is borne by the Organization is dependent entirely on voluntary contributions from Governments. In this regard, only $3.4 million have been contributed by Member States, against anticipated expenditures of some $15.4 million for the mandate period that is about to end. As these contributions have never been sufficient to meet the cost of the Force, the reimbursement claims from the troop-contributing countries have been met only up to December 1981. Unless additional contributions are received, the accumulated deficit in the UNFICYP Special Account is expected to be approximately $197.1 million for the periods from the inception of the Force to the end of the current mandate period.

VI. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

43. In my report of 19 November 1992, 1/ I reported to the Security Council on my mission of good offices. On 25 November the Council adopted resolution 789 (1992). I have been requested to keep the Council informed concerning the implementation of the confidence-building measures set out in paragraph 8 of that resolution and to submit a full report to the Council after the conclusion of the joint meetings that will resume in March 1993.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

44. It will be evident from this report that the progressive reductions in the strength of the Force which the troop-contributing Governments have found themselves obliged to make, largely for financial reasons, have brought UNFICYP to a point at which the viability of its present operational concept is in doubt. In particular, the withdrawal of the Danish battalion and the British scout car squadron will make it impossible for UNFICYP to maintain the same level of control of the buffer zone as in the past. Its ability to provide humanitarian support to the two communities will also be reduced. At the same time, UNFICYP faces a potential increase in its tasks if, as I hope, all concerned implement the confidence-building measures proposed in my report of 19 November 1992 1/ and endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 789 (1992), especially those envisaged for Varosha.

45. The troop-contributing Governments have informed me that they wish to make further reductions in their contingents during 1993 and I shall perforce take this into account in preparing the specific proposals on the restructuring of the Force requested in operative paragraph 2 of resolution 759 (1992). Meanwhile, I have asked the contributing Governments to maintain their contingents at their present strength (that is their strength after implementation of the reductions already announced (para. 4 above)) throughout the new six-month mandate period recommended in this report.

46. The principal cause of these difficulties is financial. For several years the Secretariat has predicted that unless the financing of UNFICYP was assured by assessed contributions it would prove impossible to maintain the Force. After the adoption of resolution 682 (1990) of 21 December 1990, the Secretariat cooperated actively with the Security Council in its deliberations on this issue and identified a new method of defining and rationalizing those costs incurred by the troop contributors for which the United Nations would be responsible. Unfortunately, the necessary agreement did not exist in the Council for a decision to be adopted on a change in the financing of UNFICYP, with the consequences now evident. I am pursuing my consultations with the troop-contributing Governments about a restructuring of the Force and will report as soon as possible to the Council. I am exploring the possibility of finding additional countries which could agree to contribute troops to replace those that are being withdrawn by the existing contributors. But my impression at this stage is that even if the Force is radically restructured, it is likely that a viable arrangement can only be on the basis of financing by assessed contributions.

47. The present and likely future reduction in the size of UNFICYP has major implications for the two parties. An even greater responsibility will rest on them for ensuring that there is no increase in tension in Cyprus and that conditions can be maintained for a speedy overall agreement as envisaged by the Security Council. With the reduction in UNFICYP's ability to control incidents, it is imperative that the two sides exercise maximum restraint and, in accordance with the proposed package of confidence-building measures, extend the unmanning agreement to all parts of the buffer zone where their forces remain in close proximity to each other. On the humanitarian side, it is also necessary for the two sides to work together so that their own agencies can resume the functions which, out of humanitarian concern and in its efforts to restore normal conditions, UNFICYP has assumed over the years.

48. The mixed village of Pyla is of particular concern in this regard. On my instructions, the authorities on both sides have been made aware of my anxiety about the situation there and my view that the bicommunal nature of the village demands special cooperation and understanding by both sides. The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot mukhtars must be allowed to work together without outside interference so that they can exercise the full range of their responsibilities in village affairs. I appeal again to both sides to refrain from interfering in local activities in Pyla.

49. In the prevailing circumstances, I believe that the continued presence of the Force on the island remains indispensable to achieve the objectives set by the Security Council. I therefore recommend that the Council extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further six-month period, that is until 15 June 1993. In accordance with established practice, I have undertaken consultations on this matter with the parties concerned and I will report to the Council on these consultations as soon as they have been completed.

50. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops and civilian police to UNFICYP for the steadfast support that they have given to this important peace-keeping operation of the United Nations. I also wish to thank the Governments that have made voluntary contributions towards the financing of the Force.

51. In conclusion, I wish to pay a tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Oscar Camilión, to the Force Commander, Major-General Michael Minehane, and to the military and civilian personnel of UNFICYP, who have continued to discharge with efficiency and dedication the important and difficult responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

Notes

1/ S/24830 of 19 November 1992.

2/ See Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fifth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1980, document S/14275 and footnote 57.

Notes (continued)

3 See ibid., Thirty-eighth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1983, document S/15812, para. 14.

4/ S/24050.

5/ S/18880, para. 28.

6/ See Official Records of the Security Council, Fortieth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1985, document S/17657, para. 19.


قبرص • 塞浦路斯 • CYPRUS • CHYPRE • КИПР • CHIPRE
حدود مقاطعة
区界
District boundary
Limite de district
Граница округа
Límite de distrito
مطار ، مهبط
机场，简易机场
Airfield, airstrip
Aéroport, terrain d'atterrissage
Аэродром, взлётно-посадочная полоса
Aeropuerto, pista de aterrizaje
HQ UNFICYP
HQ UNCIVPOL
HQ BRITCON
HQ CANCON
UN HP Coy ( )
UNFICYP Support Regt
Engineer Det
Signal Tp
Army Air Corps Flight
Transport Tp
Ordnance Det
Reme Workshop
Medical Centre
Canadian Logistic Coy
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Liaison Post
KYRENIA
HQ SECTOR 2 (BRITCON)
HQ Coy
One Coy
SECTOR 2
One Coy
One Coy
MP Det
One Sect
NICOSIA
UNCIVPOL Stn
HQ SECTOR 4 (AUSCON)
HQ Coy
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Coy ( )
SECTOR 4
LARNACA
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PAPHOS
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LIMASSOL
HQ SECTOR 3 (CANCON)
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One Coy
Recce Pl
UNCIVPOL Stn
وزع قوة الأمم المتحدة لصيانة السلم في قبرص في كانون الأول/ديسمبر ١٩٩٢
一九九二年十二月联塞部队的部署
UNFICYP DEPLOYMENT AS OF DECEMBER 1992
DÉPLOIEMENT DE L'UNFICYP AU MOIS DE DÉCEMBRE 1992
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНК НА ДЕКАБРЬ 1992
DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNFICYP EN DICIEMBRE DE 1992
خطوط وقف اطلاق النار للقوات التركية
土耳其部队停火线
Cease-Fire Lines of Turkish Forces
Lignes du cessez-le-feu des forces turques
Линия прекращения огня турецких войск
Líneas de cesación del fuego de las fuerzas turcas
خطوط وقف اطلاق النار للحرس الوطني القبرصي
塞浦路斯国民警卫队停火线
Cease-Fire Lines of Cyprus National Guard
Lignes du cessez-le-feu de la garde nationale chypriote
Линия прекращения огня Национальной гвардии Кипра
Líneas de cesación del fuego de la Guardia Nacional de Chipre
حدود عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة لصيانة السلم في قبرص
联塞部队行动分界线
UNFICYP operational boundaries
Limites des zones d'opérations de la Force
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНК
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza
MAP NO. 2930 REV. 31 UNITED NATIONS DECEMBER 1992

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24917/Add.1
9 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 1 June 1992-30 November 1992)

Addendum

In my report of 1 December 1992 (S/24917, para. 49), I recommended that the Security Council extend the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further period of six months and I indicated that I would report to the Council on my consultations with the parties concerned on the matter. I wish to inform the Council that the Government of Cyprus as well as the Governments of Greece and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have indicated their concurrence with the proposed extension. The Government of Turkey has indicated that it concurs with and supports the position of the Turkish Cypriot side, as expressed in previous meetings of the Security Council on the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP.

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24918
8 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Please find enclosed the fourth submission of the Government of the United States of America as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 5 of its resolution 771 (1992).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Irvin HICKS

Annex I

Supplemental United States submission of information to the United Nations Security Council in accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 771 (1992) and paragraph 1 of resolution 780 (1992)

This is the fourth submission by the United States Government of information pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 771 (1992) relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions a/ being committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. As in our three previous reports (S/24583, S/24705 and S/24791), we have focused on grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and, in accordance with resolution 771 (1992), have provided information that is "substantiated", that is, which rests upon eyewitness testimony directly available to us or that includes detail sufficient for corroboration. For the moment, we have also tried not to duplicate information provided to us from other countries and non-governmental sources, which we understand will submit reports pursuant to resolutions 771 (1992) and 780 (1992). The information provided is intended to be useful to the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 780 (1992). The United States has further substantiating information concerning the incidents included in the present report, which we will make available directly to the Commission of Experts on a confidential basis.

In accordance with paragraph 1 of resolution 780 (1992), the United States intends to continue providing reports as additional relevant information comes into its possession.

The United States is pleased that the Commission of Experts established pursuant to resolution 780 (1992) has begun its work. It particularly welcomes the steps the Commission has taken with regard to investigations of sites in the former Yugoslavia that may contain important information about violations of humanitarian law. The United States stands ready to assist the Commission in its important work of investigating allegations of war crimes with the aim of preparing cases suitable for prosecution and, by doing so, of establishing the record of humanitarian offences in the former Yugoslavia.

As in the previous reports, the notations at the end of each of the items indicate the source from which the information was drawn. Unless otherwise indicated, the reports refer to incidents occurring in 1992.

Notes

a/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, Nos. 970-973.

Annex II

Former Yugoslavia: Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention

FOURTH SUBMISSION

Wilful killing

25 September — A 48-year-old Bosnian Muslim was picked up from the street in his home town of Bijelijina on 25 or 26 September and brought to a detention camp at Klis, near Batkovic. The facility at Klis, formerly used for storing agricultural produce, was guarded by men in solid green uniforms.

The witness described how three "rich men" were singled out for special abuse: a neighbour who traded in gold and jewelry, a coffee trader and another with whom the witness was not acquainted. They were beaten with fists and rifle butts and kicked.

During the witness' second night in the camp, he saw the coffee trader and several others taken at different times from their building to an adjacent facility. There was much screaming during their absence. The others returned eventually but the coffee trader never did. The witness learned later that the coffee trader's corpse had been turned over to his family some time after that.

The gold trader suffered a similar fate on the witness' fifth night at the Klis facility; he died from his wounds. The other "wealthy" man who was beaten frequently along with first two victims never returned after being summoned to a nearby building one evening. The witness said an old cleaning man had told him that the third man also died from the beatings. (Department of State)

25 July — A 14-year-old boy from the village of Zecovi, near Prijedor, witnessed the murder of 33 people on 25 July.

The boy said that on 19 or 20 July a number of Serbs in uniform, none of whom he recognized, came to a small enclave of Muslim households near the outskirts of Zecovi. At gunpoint, the Serbs forced people out of their homes and incarcerated them in the cellar of one of the houses. After being held for more than two days, those detained were released without explanation and allowed to go back to their homes.

A few days later, on 25 July, another group of Serbs appeared, also uniformed. They ordered people out of their homes but, in the confusion, the boy was able to hide behind a board leaning against the house and his absence was not noticed. The boy witnessed these men line up 33 people and shoot them summarily with semi-automatic rifles; they then used pistols to finish off anyone who was still moving. (Department of State)

Asked if he had recognized any of this group, the witness said "They were our neighbours" from the village. He was able to identify 29 victims by name as well as 5 of those who took an active part in the shooting.

21 July-
4 August

A 36-year-old Bosnian Muslim was in his village of Ribvanovici, near Prijedor, when the Serbian army surrounded all the villages in the area on 21 July and took all of the adult males prisoner, an incident reported in an earlier submission.

The Serbian soldiers beat the prisoners with their rifles. One man began to cry, so the soldiers shot him. Half the men, including this witness, were bused to Keraterm camp in Prijedor, then to Omarska and finally Trnopolje. The witness does not know what happened to those left behind.

After a day at Trnopolje, the witness was taken back to Omarska camp and put into the "white house", where he was kept about 15 days. He was locked in a room with dozens of men, many of whom he recognized from his village. He said that every day prisoners were taken into one of five interrogation rooms and beaten with iron bars and wooden sticks.

His sister's husband was beaten to death in this manner. He had been beaten so badly one night that part of his forehead was missing, apparently taken off by an iron bar. He died soon thereafter.

The witness once watched through the window as guards took prisoners out of the "white house", told them to run and then shot them in the back as they fled. He heard what he believed were many other executions, but said they were done behind the building where they could not be seen, or in a red building nearby.

Each night, guards would choose two prisoners to bury the dead. This witness was forced to help one night and saw 11 corpses. He said the guards had them stack the bodies crosswise in a pit. Some time around 4 August he was transferred from Omarska. (Department of State)

20 July

A 52-year-old was bused to the Keraterm camp on 20 July with hundreds of others from Hambarine, near Prijedor. He was crammed along with several hundred other men into the third of four halls that formed a row on the former factory premises. From the start of his internment, he saw Muslim men regularly beaten with iron bars and rifle butts.

Every night until he was released on 5 August, men were taken outside hall No. 3 and shot. A friend, Mustafa Ramolic, was hauled outside a few days after the witness' arrival and beaten by Serb guards. His friend collapsed, coughing blood until he died later that evening.

The witness observed a mass execution on 24 July. It had been an extremely hot day. The doors and windows were closed and the men were screaming for water. What they finally received was contaminated so badly that it caused about 20 men to collapse or faint. The witness and other detaineees were convinced that the water had been poisoned.

Perhaps in response to the tumult, about 15 Serb guards came in about 10 p.m. and began beating the prisoners with their rifle butts until they fell. As the situation deteriorated, the guards occasionally fired their rifles into the crowd of prisoners who gradually pulled back towards the large garage door at one end of the hall.

When they reached the door, the guards began shooting their rifles and machine-guns into the crowd of inmates. The witness positioned himself behind the door and feigned death. The entire incident, from the opening of the doors until the shooting stopped, took about a half hour.

At dawn the following day, "volunteers" were chosen to load 130 bodies on trucks; his brother was among the dead. The witness saw approximately 40 wounded, who had waited for what they were told would be another truck to take them to a hospital, which was eventually loaded with the corpses and taken away.

A second massacre took place at about 6 a.m. on 26 July. Six soldiers entered the hall and ordered about 50 prisoners outside. As the last of the prisoners stepped outside, the six Serbian guards began firing their automatic weapons. When all 50 had fallen, the guards went around shooting those who were still groaning. The witness recognized those who took part in this second mass execution.

Following this second massacre, 10 "volunteers" were again selected to load the corpses. They had to ride in the same truck that took the bodies away. The 10 "volunteers" never came back.

That same day, inmates were evacuated from all the halls. About a dozen from each were tasked with cleaning and hosing down the halls. The rumour was that the camp had received a new commander and that some international commission was expected to inspect the facilities. The "commission" came on 5 August, when buses took the witness and other inmates to Trnopolje. (Department of State)

9 July — A 35-year-old Muslim woman from Trnopolje described her husband's murder. On 9 July, her husband was taken to a detention camp at the nearby school, but was quickly released because the Serbs running the camp recognized him as a famous "Yugoslav" athlete who had won the 1981 European body-building championship in London.

Soon after his return, upon hearing of Serbian evictions of Muslim residents of the area, the family left their home. When the witness ran back to get something she had forgotten, four soldiers standing at the nearby corner stopped her husband and ordered his two children to keep going. The children were further down the street when their mother, the witness, caught up with her husband and the four soldiers. One of them, once considered to be a friend of her husband, spoke to them briefly.

The soldiers then ordered her to move on, saying her husband had to stay there. She tried to give him the key to their home but he too told her to move on and catch up with the children. She did so, and was about 20 metres away when shots rang out behind her. The children were about to turn a corner at the end of the street when the shots were fired. All of them, crying, tried to go back, but were blocked by other soldiers.

Two days later when the witness was allowed to return to her home for food, she saw her husband's corpse, which apparently had not been moved from the spot where he had been summarily executed two days earlier. (Department of State)

11 June-10 October — A 24-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Kotor Varos was arrested as a civilian and interned in several locations in Kotor Varos from 11 June until 10 October. He described how he had been viciously and sadistically beaten several times, had witnessed forced sex acts among male prisoners and had been forced at gunpoint to participate in the gang rape/killing of a Muslim woman.

On one day, the witness and 11 other prisoners were forced to participate in the rape of a Muslim policeman's wife. He exclaimed "They did everything. You can't imagine or believe what they did. They are animals!" He said that the woman died from her injuries one week later.

During the first eight days of his internment, a Serbian TV news crew from Banja Luka arrived and accused him of beating women and killing foetuses during his tenure as a soldier for the Croatian forces. He was required to read such a statement admitting to these acts because a Serbian army captain threatened to kill his parents and family members if he did not.

The witness was later transferred to a room in the back of the Osnovni Sud, or town courthouse, where he said that three men died in his arms from the beatings and injuries they had endured: Enver Beharic, Mato Vatelj and Smajo Celinac. He named these men and claimed that their bodies were mutilated after their deaths. All three men were killed between 13 and 15 August.

The witness stated further that the number of people killed in Kotor Varos was almost unimaginable. On 11 June alone 300 to 400 corpses lay in the street. He and several other prisoners had to put the corpses into black nylon body bags. The bags were then carried by a bulldozer to a nearby mass grave, and he described the location in detail. He said that he personally put over 70 bodies into bags that day, and estimated that a minimum of 1,000 people were buried in this grave. (Department of State)

June-July

A 21-year-old Serbian fighter described his own shooting of 10 members of a Muslim family in late June in Ahatovici: "It was taken for granted among us that they should be killed. So when somebody said 'Shoot', I swung around and pulled the trigger, three times, on automatic fire. I remember the little girl with the red dress hiding behind her granny."

The Serbian fighter recounted another incident in which he used a six-inch hunting knife to cut the throats of three captured Muslims.

He claimed to have made visits every three or four days to a motel and restaurant complex outside Vogosca, located seven miles north of Sarajevo, known as the Sonja Cafe, which had been converted into a prison for Muslim women. He identified the "prison commander", who he said had established a "system" for the Serbian fighters to rape and kill the women interned there. He and his companions were encouraged to go to the Sonja Cafe by military commanders because raping Muslim women was "good for raising the fighters' morale". They were further told by the prison commander:

> "You can do with the women what you like. You can take them away from here - we don't have enough food for them anyway - and don't bring them back."

This fighter claimed to have raped and murdered eight women from the motel prison complex.

He also said he had seen 30 men from Donja Bioca being shot and loaded - some alive - into a furnace at a steel plant at Ilijas, a town north of Vogosca in July. (The New York Times)

Late June — A 27-year-old Bosnian Muslim watched Serbian Chetniks conduct mass executions on a bridge at Brod, four kilometres south of Foca, on three consecutive evenings towards the end of June. He witnessed the executions from a hiding place in the attic of a Serbian friend's home.

At about 6 p.m. of the first day, this witness saw Serb soldiers march small groups of Muslim men onto the bridge in Brod. In the middle of the bridge, which was about 100 metres long, the Chetniks interrogated the Muslims for about two hours. Among the 20 to 30 Muslim men, the witness could recognize from his hiding place four friends: Ramo Kadric, Saban Kurtovic, Nusret Cengic and Ibro Colakovic.

Just as it was getting dark, the haranguing stopped and the shooting started. About 8 of the 30 to 40 soldiers fired their automatic weapons at their tied-up Muslim captives. The witness was able to identify the man in charge of the Serbs on the bridge.

When there were no signs of life among the Muslims, the Serbs dumped their bodies over the metre-high wall of the bridge into the Drina River, about 20 metres below.

The following evening, the Chetnik band led another column of Muslim prisoners to the bridge from the other direction. This group was from the witness' hamlet of Trnovace and involved 50 to 60 captives. They were killed in the same fashion. Among the victims he recognized were: Esad Beckovic, Esad Dzin, Nedzao Dzin, Dzevad Beckovic, Zvijerac Beckovic, Hamdija Beckovic and Serif Beckovic.

The next massacre on the bridge occurred close to midnight of the third evening. The victims were brought to the bridge by bus and truck from the town of Miljevina, about eight kilometres north-west of Brod, also on the opposite side of the river. The entire operation was carried out more quickly; this time about 50 men were murdered.

The wives and children of the victims were kept for several days in an area school, during which time they had to sign over the ownership papers to their homes. (Department of State)

31 May-July

A 43-year-old Muslim from Hambarine was picked up on 31 May in Prijedor by Serb militiamen and herded along with other Muslims into one of the buses and trucks waiting to take them to Keraterm. He claims the more educated Muslims were taken to Omarska. The witness saw four of the Muslim captives randomly shot to death as the loading process took place. He knew two of the victims, the brothers Suelgo and Ismo Dzafic.

The Keraterm facility was divided into four subdivisions or halls. The witness was in hall No. 1. On 22 or 24 July, a hall at the opposite end of the facility was packed with prisoners from an area where heavy fighting had taken place, and where the Serbs reportedly had sustained heavy casualties.

The Serbs machine-gunned to death about 200 of the newly arrived prisoners in that hall. The witness said many of the inmates could see the massacre in the adjacent hall No. 3, so word of what was taking place spread almost instantly. He and all the occupants could hear the firing and screaming, which lasted for about 15 to 20 minutes.

The following morning he also observed trucks loaded with corpses driving from hall No. 4 past the window of hall No. 1 where he was detained. About five men were taken from his hall to help load the corpses. Another man with a badly infected arm was put on a truck full of corpses along with about 20 other injured men. The witness never saw this man again and believes he was killed. (Department of State)

25 May

A 30-year-old Muslim was in Kozarac when the Serbs began a massive artillery bombardment in the mid-afternoon of 25 May. As he and a crowd that he estimated at 10,000 to 12,000 headed for the shelter of the nearby forest, the Serbs directed their fire at fleeing civilians. Five or six women running near the witness were killed by a shell just before they reached the tree line. (Department of State)

18 May

A 33-year-old Muslim from Grbavci, two kilometres from Zvornik, described a mass killing on the morning of 18 May. As Serb militiamen surrounded the village and started shooting, he and several family members fled.

Residents of nearby houses were doing the same. Inside the village, the Serb militia occupiers, using megaphones, ordered residents to go back to their homes and put white sheets in their windows. Many of the neighbours obeyed, but this witness and his family decided to wait in their hiding place inside the tree line to assess the situation further.

As his neighbours returned to the housing area, hands over their heads, the Serb militiamen separated men from women and children. The witness watched from about 200 metres as the men were lined up. Shortly after noon, one of the Serbs shouted an order to "kill the Ustasha". On this command, about 10 of the militiamen began emptying their automatic weapons into the line of Muslim men and continued shooting until they were all dead. When the shooting stopped, the executioners and other Serb militia, many of whom had been standing around watching, started plundering houses in the village and stealing livestock.

The witness, his family and other neighbours returned from their hiding place three days later. He participated along with other neighbours in the burial of 56 victims. They were buried about 20 metres from the edge of the existing cemetery, between two rows of houses, near the spot where they were shot. (Department of State)

9 May — A 41-year-old Bosnian Muslim woman witnessed the execution of a Serbian civilian by Serbian soldiers in Sarajevo.

At about 7 a.m. on 9 or 10 May, military units wearing the insignias of Serbian Chetniks and the Yugoslav army entered the area (near Sarajevo airport) and ordered all its residents out of the cellars in which they had taken refuge. Once outside, Serbs were told to stand in one place and Muslims in another.

One Serb, a 50-year-old man known as "Ljubo", refused to be separated from his Muslim neighbours, with whom he apparently had lived peacefully for many years. His refusal to be separated from his neighbours enraged the Serbian soldiers. They dragged him to the ground, and five or six of them beat him until he was dead.

The witness and a group of about 40 other Muslims from the area were then used as human shields and marched through a heavily contested combat zone to waiting Serb vehicles some 300 metres away. From there, they were driven to Trapare, a camp or assembly area some three kilometres away.

After their arrival at Trapare, a young girl, about 12 years old, was taken from her father. About six men took the girl behind a nearby bunker. The witness said she then could hear the most terrible screaming and crying she had ever heard. After the father collapsed, he was dragged at knife point to the bunker and forced to watch as the soldiers repeatedly raped his daughter, an ordeal which lasted about an hour. Neither the father nor his daughter was returned to the others afterward. The witness believes both were killed. (Department of State)

5 May

In an October letter to President Bush, a Muslim refugee from Brcko described in detail his internment in Brcko camp in northern Bosnia. Below is an informal translation of segments of the letter pertaining to Brcko:

"On 5 May a representative of the Yugo army in a radio broadcast instructed the citizens in my part of the town to go to the army barracks, from where the Yugo army would organize an evacuation to a safer place.

"Upon our arrival at the barracks, we realized we were all in a trap because there, together with the regular army, were Chetniks and other Serbian refuse. They offered to give us rifles if we would fight against our own people for the Serbian cause. The Muslims and Croats silently refused. Our wives and children were put on a bus and were taken to an unknown destination.

"At gunpoint, we were also put on a bus. We were taken to one of Brcko's places of execution, a physical education hall in the centre of the town. We noticed, from the puddles of blood on the floor, that the executions had already begun. For the couple hundred of us who were locked up, the long hours of torture began.

"They took four of us out for execution. They put one of us against the wall and ... shot him in the back with a machine-gun. Looking at the holes in his back ... I lost consciousness, and my body crumbled onto pieces of glass. My fainting awakened a bit of humanity in the Serbs' leader. He ordered them to bring me back to the hall, where I could rest a little. One of the Serbs took satisfaction in removing my glasses and breaking them.

"The other three men were killed in the most cruel manner. First they were beaten in another room and left to recover a little. They were taken to a courtyard where we heard the worst sounds that a human throat can produce. We heard the dull slashes of knives cutting into human flesh. The three men were held by their legs and beaten while against the wall of the building where we were imprisoned. With about 20 more shots, the Serbs assured the three men's death.

"All that I have written here can be confirmed by three other witnesses who also managed to escape from that hell. I think we were lucky that we went through all this in the first days of the Serbian occupation, while the Serbian killing machinery was not so well developed." (Department of State)

Torture of prisoners

August-September

A United States surgeon from California spent two weeks in Bosnia/Herzegovina (including the time at Kosevo hospital in Sarajevo) in late August and early September performing remedial urological surgery.

The doctor reportedly found that Muslim and Mujahedin irregular troops, some from Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, had routinely performed crude, disfiguring, non-medical circumcisions on Bosnian Serb soldiers, and he treated one 18-year-old Bosnian Serb soldier who had been so brutally circumcised that eventually the entire organ required amputation. (Department of State/News Service)

July-August

A Croatian woman, married to a Serb, was interned for 40 days at the Bosnian government-run detention centre at the former Yugoslav National Army (JNA) Viktor Bubanj Barracks in Sarajevo. During her confinement, guards, whom she identified as Muslims, routinely beat the more than 300 prisoners, including 30 women.

She saw one woman covered with bruises from head to toe after being so abused. She herself was beaten several times. Another woman cut by glass during a mortar attack was left overnight to bleed, as the guards taunted her that "It is your people who are killing you, not us." This witness was released in late August. (Department of State)

11 June-10 October

A 24-year-old Bosnian Muslim agricultural technician from Kotor Varos was arrested as a civilian and interned in several locations in Kotor Varos.

Twelve Serbian soldiers, wearing uniforms bearing white eagles, arrested the witness on 11 June in his house and beat him in his yard before escorting him to the Koza Proletaria Fur Factory, where he was interrogated and beaten further.

At the fur factory, a guard put a rifle in the witness' mouth and lifted him off the floor. Another guard pulled out two of his upper teeth with pliers. He said he and 100 other men were beaten for eight days and forced to perform sexual acts on each other.

He was later transferred to a room in the back of the Osnovi Sud, or town courthouse, where he was held for three and a half months. He said that 170 men were held there under extremely oppressive conditions.

His room measured only about 2.5 by 3.5 metres, yet sometimes as many as 70 men were crammed into it. Serbian guards played loud music as they beat prisoners in the adjoining rooms and in the yard. The room was filthy. They ate spoiled, mouldy food, and had no access to toilet facilities. Ten to 15 men had diarrhoea at any one time. The prisoners' skin turned yellow from jaundice. He spent over three months in such conditions without ever taking a bath or washing his clothes.

On 10 October, the witness and two other Muslims were exchanged for one Serb. Three Serbian guards, whom he recognized, brought him to the courthouse yard where they beat him viciously, then tied his arms and legs together like a sheep and forced him to baa. Later they tied him to a Land Rover jeep and drove to the hospital, with the witness running behind the vehicle. Upon arrival, they forced him to crawl, baa and eat grass, and then they told him to throw up the grass because it was Serbian grass.

One guard brought some very acidic gun-cleaning oil and made the witness drink half a litre of it. He began to have stomach convulsions immediately. A second pulled up his sleeve and extinguished eight cigarettes on his arm. Soon afterward he was released to Muslim forces in the village of Vecic. (Department of State)

May-November A woman from Zrenjanin, a town in southern Vojvodina, reported that her husband, a Muslim, was detained by police on 10 May and remains to this day with about 200 other Muslims, mostly from Bosanski Samac or its immediate environs, in two large warehouses adjacent to the central police station in Bosanski Samac, a town on the Croatian-Bosnian border in Bosnia.

On several occasions when this woman was able to visit the detention facility, she talked with her husband and helped treat prisoners who had been beaten brutally. The prisoners she treated had been beaten on the head, arms, and torso. Many had had their arms broken.

Her husband said that he had been beaten severely during the first several days of his incarceration, and that he had never been told why he was being held. Other members of her husband's family, including his mother, his sister and his sister's children, were also detainees in Bosanski Samac. Her husband claimed that the conditions were very bad in the facility and that the prisoners were given only one meal a day, which often consisted only of bread. (Department of State)

Deliberate attacks on non-combatants

18 November — On 18 November Bosnian Serbs shelled the main north-south highway near the city of Mostar, which forced a United Nations food convoy and its escort of Spanish United Nations peace-keeping troops to abandon an attempt to bring food and housing materials to Sarajevo. (The Washington Post)

16 November — Serbian artillery stationed in north-eastern Bosnia fired 100 shells into Croatia at Zupanja and surrounding villages, causing the death of two persons, including a two-year-old child, and injuring another child. Heavy damage to houses was also reported. (Department of State)

7-8 November — On 8 November Bosnian Serbs halted relief convoys along the Mostar road. An UNPROFOR (United Kingdom)-escorted convoy was stopped by Croatian Defence Council (HVO) forces 10 kilometres north of Mostar. (Department of State)

On 7 November Bosnian Serbs fired up to 200 rounds of machine-gun, mortar and automatic rifle fire at a British convoy that was trying to find routes for United Nations aid convoys near Tuzla, hitting a British Land Rover. According to a United Kingdom Ministry of Defence spokesman, "This is the first time we have come under direct fire and the first time we have returned fire". (London Press Association)

Wanton devastation and destruction of property

25 May — A 43-year-old Muslim from Hambarine watched from a nearby hill as Serbian artillery demolished the neighbouring village of Kozarac on 25 May. The artillery unit was part of the so-called Serbian "white eagle" militia organization, whose commander and tank unit leader he identified. (Department of State)

17 May — Kozarac, in Bosnian Krajina, was flattened in May by Serbian forces. (New York Newsday)

April-October — From the beginning of the war in April, Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) paramilitary forces in the hills around Sarajevo have bombarded the city, which has little in it that could be called a military target. The assault on the city has damaged or destroyed hospitals, schools, residential buildings, mosques, churches and all kinds of other civilian facilities. (Department of State)

Fall 1991 — Serbian forces in the fall of 1991 left Vukovar and several surrounding towns, in the Sector East United Nations Protected Area (UNPA) of Croatia, looking like Berlin circa 1945. Nearly every residential, commercial, cultural and religious structure was gutted or damaged severely. Grain elevators, cranes in the port along the river, factories and high-rise apartment buildings were rendered virtually useless and uninhabitable. (Department of State)

Other, including mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilian

November — In early November 1992 Serb military authorities began forcibly to mobilize ethnic Croats and Muslims in the Banja Luka area, and have taken 50 to 200 such conscripts from the suburbs of Gornji Seher and Debeljaci because, according to a Serb official, "There are too many Muslims here". (Department of State)

26 May — A 35-year-old Muslim woman, a resident of Trnopolje long before it gained notoriety as the site of a brutal internment camp, was present on 26 May when trucks and tractors hauled in thousands of children and elderly Muslims from the nearby town of Kozarac, following its destruction by Serbian artillery. The newly arrived refugees were settled on the grounds of the local elementary school.

The Muslim woman and other town residents were permitted to pass food to them through fences that were being erected around the facility. During the first five days, it was the only food the new arrivals received. Additionally, all the homes in the area were forced to take in large numbers of Kozarac residents. Her family took in 38 of those refugees.

Many of the refugees, including those in her home, were eventually transported in railroad freight cars, about a hundred to a car, to facilities further away. On 8 July soldiers came to the house and said the entire village was being "ethnically cleansed". She and her family were forced from her home. Three days later, she and her children were herded with others into a railroad car and forced out near Muslim-controlled territory, whence they made their way to refuge abroad. (Department of State)

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24919
8 December 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 4 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF MOROCCO TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour, with reference to his note of 26 October 1992, to provide him with the following information:

Morocco is not holding any Iraqi funds that represent the proceeds of sale of petroleum before the Gulf crisis. It should also be pointed out that the $5.36 million of Iraqi assets previously held by the companies Société chérifienne des pétroles and Société anonyme marocaine de l'industrie du raffinage (SAMIR) have been used to settle part of Iraq's commercial debt to Morocco, which amounts to over $30 million.

Additionally, in order further to alleviate the financial problems still faced by the enterprises concerned, those instalments of the loan granted to Morocco by the Iraqi Fund for External Development which fall due on 31 December 1992 and 30 June 1993 have been drawn in advance to settle part of Morocco's outstanding claims.

92-78165 3679f (E) 081292 081292

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24920
8 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 4 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PORTUGAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to refer to his note of 26 October 1992 regarding holdings of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products or funds of the Government of Iraq, or of its State bodies, corporations or agencies, that represent the proceeds of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products subject to the provisions of Security Council resolution 778 (1992).

The Permanent Representative of Portugal wishes to inform the Secretary-General that the Portuguese authorities are in a position to certify that no such funds, petroleum or petroleum products are currently held in Portugal.

92-78064 3884e (E) 081292 081292

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24921
8 December 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 7 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to notify you of further violations of Iraqi airspace by United States aircraft for the purposes of observation and provocation between 25 November and 3 December 1992.

25-26 November 1992

(a) Northern region: 16 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 4,000 to 7,500 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 36 sorties, flown by F-4, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 3,000 to 6,000 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qal'at Salih, Qurnah, Salman, Busayyah, Jalibah and Artawi.

26-27 November 1992

(a) Northern region: 20 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 4,000 to 7,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Zakho, Dohuk, Tall Afar and Dukan.

(b) Southern region: 33 sorties, flown by F-4, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 4,000 to 8,000 metres, centred over Amarah, Nasiriyah, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Busayyah, Shatrah and Salman.

27-28 November 1992

(a) Northern region: one sortie, flown by two aircraft at a speed of 720 kilometres per hour and at medium altitude, over Zakho.

(b) Southern region: 40 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Amarah, Artawi, Samawah and Busayyah.

28-29 November 1992

(a) Northern region: no aerial activity recorded in the region during this period.

(b) Southern region: 37 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 4,000 to 20,000 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Busayyah, Artawi and Jalibah.

A TR-1 aircraft engaged in hostile aerial reconnaissance of the southern region from an altitude of 20,000 metres, entering Iraqi airspace at 1155 hours on 29 November 1992 and leaving at 1435 hours.

29-30 November 1992

(a) Northern region: 22 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 10,000 metres, centred over Zakho, Dohuk, Mosul, Irbil, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 57 sorties, flown by F-4, F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 8,500 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qurnah, Busayyah, Salman, Amarah, Shatrah and Jalibah.

30 November-1 December 1992

(a) Northern region: 28 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 1,000 to 6,500 metres, centred over Mosul, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Zakho and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: no aerial activity recorded during this period.

1-2 December 1992

(a) Northern region: 16 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 7,500 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Amadiyah and Tall Afar.

(b) Southern region: 36 sorties, flown by F-4, F-14 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 8,000 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qurnah, Salman, Busayyah, Jalibah and Artawi.

2-3 December 1992

(a) Northern region: 13 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Zakho, Dohuk, Mosul and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 21 sorties, flown by F-4, F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds of 720 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Basra, Qurnah, Amarah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Jalibah and Salman.

A TR-1 aircraft engaged in hostile reconnaissance of the southern region from an altitude of 20,000 metres, entering Iraqi airspace at 1148 hours on 3 December 1992 and leaving at 1440 hours.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative